This article examines the applicability of the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR) when a State loses control over parts of its territory. It argues that the jurisprudence of the European Court for Human Rights, which insists on residual positive obligations based in sovereign title over territory, is problematic and needs to be rethought. The Court's current approach is not only likely to provoke backlash, since it requires it to decide politically explosive questions of sovereign title, but does so for very little practical benefit for the protection of human rights. The article therefore explores more preferable alternatives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The world is replete with examples of contested territories, in which there is a dispute over sovereignty, or the title-bearing State is unable to exercise control over all of its territoryconsider only the hold that, until very recently, the Islamic State terrorist group had over vast swathes of Iraq and Syria. Such situations also exist in Europe and they have increasingly arisen in cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This article explores the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in contested territories, in light of the Court's case law. This topic has not attracted much attention in the academic literature, 1 but its significance, politically and legally, is both manifest and is likely to be on the rise. For instance, the Court currently has on its docket an interstate case between Georgia and Russia, three interstate cases between Ukraine and Russia, and thousands of individual applications which concern either Crimea or Eastern Ukraine.
This article's main focus is on the threshold question of the ECHR's applicability, rather than on its substantive application -that is, we will be looking at whether the ECHR applies in contested territories, rather than at how its rights and obligations apply in specific factual contexts. However, although these two issues are conceptually distinct, as a matter of practical reality they are not; it is inevitable that potential substantive consequences influence legal and policy views on threshold questions. 2 This article argues that the Court's jurisprudence on the ECHR's applicability in contested territories is evolving -which is a good thing, because that evolution is much needed -but that the overall direction of this evolution remains unclear. The article sets out the different options that the Court might take in this dynamic process, with their upsides and downsides.
Section 2 defines the scope of our inquiry, by setting out the basic framework of the Convention's territorial scope of application under Article 1 thereof, and by examining different types of contested territories. Section 3 provides an overview of Strasbourg jurisprudence in situations of loss of state control over parts of its territory. Section 4 evaluates the Court's approach and argues that it needs to be rethought. In particular, the idea of residual positive obligations grounded solely in sovereign title is conceptually unsound and normatively State has jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 over all of its territory. 7 However, as we will explain in more detail below, the Court also held that, in exceptional circumstances, this presumption could be rebutted or altered. 8 In line with other human rights bodies, the Court has interpreted the word 'jurisdiction' in two basic ways. 9 First, as a spatial concept -an individual is within a state's jurisdiction if they are located within a territory or area over which the State has effective overall control. Second, as a personal concept -an individual is within a state's jurisdiction if they were subject to the authority or control of a State agent. Both models of jurisdiction were reaffirmed in Al-Skeini, which remains the Court's leading case on Article 1. 10 However, most leading Article 1 cases concern situations of the ECHR extraterritorial applicability, e.g. to the conduct of British troops in the occupation of Iraq, while our main concern here is the applicability of the Convention within a state's territory when the State has lost control over that territory.
B. Position under general international law
The general international law of treaties does not provide much guidance with regard to the application of treaties to parts of State territory outside its control. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that '[u]nless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory.' 11 The focus of this provision is, however, on treaty-making by states which have territorial sub-units with a significant degree of political autonomy. In the context of federal or non-unitary states federal clauses can permit a state's units to be exempt from the scope of the treaty or limit obligations of the federal/non-unitary State in the matters that are outside of its constitutional power. 12 There is no such clause in the ECHR. 13 The Convention does however 7 
C. Defining contested territories
The term 'contested territories' that we are employing here is not a legal term of art, but is useful shorthand for several different types of situations which entail the loss of territorial control, and which we will now elaborate on. First, we can distinguish between territorial contestation that is primarily internal, i.e. coming from within the relevant State, and contestation which is primarily external, i.e. involves another State.
In the first scenario, the State loses control over a part of its territory due to its inability to suppress the activities of a non-state actor in the area, provide basic public functions and The initial approach of the European Commission to situations of loss of a state's control over its territory was simple: there was a presumption that the State had control over all of the territory to which it had title, but that presumption was rebuttable on the facts. If it was indeed rebutted, the territorial State no longer had obligations under the ECHR, as it no longer had jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 over the area concerned. The first such cases were those on northern Cyprus.
In 1974, the separatist Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was established through the use of regular Turkish armed forces. The presumption of Cyprus' jurisdiction was rebutted either expressly, 21 or by implication, in cases against Turkey, which was held to have extraterritorial jurisdiction in northern Cyprus and consequently obligations under the ECHR. At the same time, however, the Commission has also found that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus "have since 1974 been prevented from exercising their jurisdiction in the north of the island. This restriction on the actual exercise of jurisdiction ... is due to the presence of Turkish armed forces" (ibid.).
The Commission now finds that the authority of the respondent Government is in fact still limited to the southern part of Cyprus. It follows that the Republic of Cyprus cannot be held responsible under Article 1 (Art. 1) of the Convention for the acts of Turkish Cypriot authorities in the north of Cyprus of which the present applicants complain.
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The Commission's reference to Cyprus' lack of responsibility for the acts of Turkish Cypriot authorities could be interpreted as the application of an attribution test. In context, however, it is clear that the Commission was thinking in terms of lack of obligation on the part of Cyprus, due to its lack of actual jurisdiction in the north. Note also how the Commission did not hesitate to expressly affirm Cyprus' continued sovereignty over the contested territory. In its 1996 Loizidou judgment the Court likewise recalled the rejection of the TRNC's claim to statehood by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and European institutions, stating that 'the international community does not regard the "TRNC" as a State under international law and that the Republic of Cyprus has remained the sole legitimate Government of Cyprus -itself, bound to respect international standards in the field of the protection of human and minority rights.' 25 The Court did not however remark on the scope of Cyprus' obligation due to its lack of territorial control, as it was not called upon to do so. Note the reference to a limitation rather than a rebuttal of jurisdiction. The Court then held that Moldova did not exercise authority over part of its territory, which was under the effective control of the MRT, 37 but nevertheless found that it still had positive obligations under Article 1in order to secure ECHR rights. 38 These residual positive obligations are twofold, including measures (1) aimed at re-establishing its control over the territory in question, and (2) securing the applicants' individual rights. 39 Hence, the factual situation in the Transdniestrian region did not mean that Moldova ceased to have jurisdiction, and thus obligations, under the ECHR. Rather, its jurisdiction was reduced in scope to certain specified positive obligations:
On the basis of all the material in its possession, the Court considers that the Moldovan Government, the only legitimate government of the Republic of Moldova under international law, does not exercise authority over part of its territory, namely that part which is under the effective control of the "MRT". ... However, even in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian region, Moldova still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.
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The ECtHR thus held that Moldova violated these obligations because after 2001 it failed to discuss the applicants' case in the negotiations for a settlement of the situation in Transdniestria, and failed to consider or take any other steps to secure to the applicants their ECHR rights.
41
The holding of the ECtHR in this case was innovative for several reasons. First, jurisdiction was not discussed in terms of a presumption and its rebuttal, as before. Moldova's obligation under Article 1 of the Convention, to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the [Convention] rights and freedoms", was, however, limited in the circumstances to a positive obligation to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that were both in its power to take and in accordance with international law … The Court sees no ground on which to distinguish the present case. Although Moldova has no effective control over the acts of the "MRT" in Transdniestria, the fact that the region is recognised under public international law as part of Moldova's territory gives rise to an obligation, under Article 1 of the Convention, to use all legal and diplomatic means available to it to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention to those living there.
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On the facts, however, and unlike in Ilaşcu, the Court found that Moldova had indeed satisfied its positive obligations. 52 It also found that Russia continued to exercise jurisdiction 44 This will be discussed in the next section.
C. Sargsyan: jurisdiction undiminished
The case of Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan arose in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The applicants were denied return to their village, situated in the territory of Azerbaijan, but close to or on the line of contact between this State and the selfproclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The village was destroyed, mined and remained inaccessible to any civilian. investigating a multiple homicide which occurred in Cypriot territory, whereas relevant evidence and suspects were present in Turkish and TRNC-controlled territory. 96 While the Chamber was split by 5 votes to 2 on whether Cyprus had the duty to cooperate with separatist TRNC authorities (the majority essentially finding that it did), it was unanimous that Turkey had the obligation to cooperate with Cyprus, solely on the basis that the suspects were present on its territory, 97 a holding difficult to square with the victim-focused case law on the jurisdiction clause in Article 1 ECHR. As of the time of writing, the case is pending before the Grand Chamber.
IV. EVALUATING THE COURT'S APPROACH
It is, as in all matters concerning Article 1 ECHR, difficult to provide a precise descriptive account of the ECtHR's approach to the Convention's applicability in contested territories. This is primarily because the Court's approach has evolved in a very ad hoc, fact-dependent way.
Initially the Commission and the Court both applied a simple, binary analysis -if the State concerned no longer had control of a part of its territory, then it no longer had jurisdiction over that area. The State will be presumed to have control over all territory over which it has title, but this is a simple evidentiary presumption which is in line with the fact that most states control most of their territory most of the time. This presumption is rebuttable, and the consequence of the rebuttal is lack of jurisdiction and therefore lack of any ECHR obligations.
The main shift in the Court's approach happens in Ilasçu, where residual positive obligations are directly tied to the state's sovereignty over the territory. Jurisdiction is thus reduced in scope in the case of loss of State control over territory, but not extinguished; it persists, if diminished, on the basis of title alone. We have seen the various difficulties that the Court has had to grapple with post-Ilasçu; another major concern is the continuing confusion Second, residual positive obligations bring few practical benefits; they will rarely have significant bite. Recall how the Court in Ilasçu articulated two such obligations -Moldova's obligation to take reasonable measures to re-establish its control over the contested territory, and 98 Loizidou (merits), para 52: 'the responsibility of a Contracting Party could also arise when as a consequence of military action -whether lawful or unlawful -it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control (… When it comes to the more specific obligation to secure the rights of individual applicants, it may have some practical relevance, but again not hugely so. In the vast majority of cases the entity controlling the area, and thus having the actual capacity to violate or secure the applicants' rights, will be antagonistic to the central State authorities and there is only so much that the latter will be able to do. If we look at the facts of Catan, for example, in which the Court had found Moldova to have already discharged its positive obligations regarding schools in Trandniestria which wanted to use the Latin script, we will see that the actual enjoyment of the rights in question depends foremost on the separatist authorities. If the Catan judgment had any positive impact on the matter (and we do not know whether it actually did), it would be because of the Russian side of the case, as it is Russia that has decisive influence over the separatists. In short, the residual positive obligations articulated by the Court are in most instances likely to have only a marginal benefit.
The third problem with the idea of residual positive obligation grounded in title is that it logically requires the Court to pronounce on the sovereignty over the contested territory if it 104 Ilasçu, para 339. 105 ibid para 345. See also Yudkivska (n 1), at 9: '[The obligation to re-establish control] appears to be pure political rhetoric having little to do with legal obligations, and also hardly subject to assessment by legal measures. Moldova was further obliged "to refrain from supporting separatist regime.'' I find it rather difficult to reconcile positive obligations towards people remaining on occupied territories with the obligation to refrain from supporting the separatist regime. These obligations seem mutually exclusive -if a state engages in negotiations with separatists requesting them to secure human rights of individuals on occupied territories (that was precisely what the Court was expecting to have been done for Mr Ilascu), it follows that it would propose something in exchange, such as providing economic support they might need. If Moldova was under obligation to negotiate the release of Mr Ilascu and others, it had to give something to the separatists in addition to the already ceded territory.'
wishes to find a violation of the residual obligation. The Court may well find itself in an unenviable position if a factual pattern emerges which alleges violations of residual obligations on the part of Ukraine which are of similar gravity to Ilasçu, so that it could not easily pull an Azemi avoidance manoeuvre. In such a case, again, if it wishes to find a violation of the residual obligation it must also rule that Ukraine remains the sovereign of Crimea. It would not have to rule on sovereignty for any violation on the part of Russia, whose jurisdiction can simply be based on the effective control over the area, whether obtained lawfully or unlawfully. 107 It is thus manifest that, although the Court's Ilasçu jurisprudence was motivated by good intentions, it carries with it significant risks. At least to our eyes, the costs would seem to clearly outweigh the benefits. And while it is unlikely that the Court would overrule Ilasçu expressly, 108 it may nonetheless choose to apply it very narrowly.
What, then, would be the possible alternatives?
There are, in our view, two such viable alternatives. The first is to return to the traditional binary approach -jurisdiction as a purely factual notion of territorial control, which may be presumed in territories over which the State has title. But once that presumption is rebutted, the State will no longer have jurisdiction, and therefore no positive obligations. This is the approach that we would endorse. Its principal virtue is its clarity, both regarding the factual control test and the consequences that follow. 109 Once engaged, the full positive obligation to secure human rights in the area would apply. On the other hand, this approach may, in exceptional cases, be underinclusive, in the sense that there would be things that the State could do to mitigate an adverse situation for an individual, as in Ilasçu, which do not require territorial control. As we explained above, however, such situations will be rare, because the residual positive obligation as articulated by the Court has so little bite. The underinclusiveness is, in other words, offset by the clarity and manageability of the jurisdictional test, which applies in essentially the same way both intra-and extraterritorially.
The second alternative would be to apply a more functional approach, which would tie the emergence of positive obligations directly to the state's capacity to fulfil them. Such capacity would vary depending on the level of influence it exercises in any given area. Whereas the binary approach is an all-or-nothing one in terms of the applicability of positive obligations, here they would be divided and tailored depending on the circumstances. 110 The basis of the obligations would not, however, be in sovereignty over the territory, but in the capacity to fulfil these obligations as a matter of fact. 111 In other words, the positive obligation is not only flexible but it is not residual, since its basis is in capacity rather than in title; in particular, the Court would not need to rule in any way on a sovereignty dispute regarding the specific territory in question.
extraterritorially) by reference to the level of State ability to fulfil it. 112 Another useful analogy is to the threshold of belligerent occupation in IHL. Scholars are divided in that regard between the adherents of a more traditional, binary approach, in which occupation requires boots on the ground and exists either fully or not at all, and the advocates of a more functional approach, in which the status of occupation, and the level of obligations that flow from it, are more matters of degree than of bright lines. 113 The paradigmatic example around which this debate is normally had is of course Israel's position with regard to Gaza, in which it (generally) does not have boots on the ground but over which it has a an enormous degree of influence. 
V. CONCLUSION
The flow of cases dealing with contested territories, especially in Eastern Europe, is not going to be abating in the near-to-medium term. There is therefore an urgent need for the European Court to adopt a coherent, principled approach to such cases, 115 especially because they are also related, legally, factually and politically, to situations of extraterritorial application. Post AlSkeini the Court's approach to extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction in the sense of Article 1 seems to be evolving in the right (more factual, and more expansive) direction. Within contested territories, however, the Court's Ilasçu jurisprudence remains problematic. As we have seen, the whole idea of residual obligations based in sovereignty is especially challenging in situations of territorial contestation which are chronic, and in which the contestation happens between two
States (as with Ukraine and Russia over Crimea) or between a State and an entity which has a legally arguable claim to statehood (as with Serbia and Kosovo). If the Court has to rule on the sovereignty claims in such cases -at is logically has to if it wishes to find a violation of the residual positive obligation -it runs the risk of provoking significant political backlash without doing much, if anything, to meaningfully advance the human rights of the individuals concerned.
We do not think it wise, especially in the current political climate, for the Court to be deciding on say (the lack of) Russia's sovereignty over Crimea when it has better alternatives available, such as the binary and functional approaches we have looked at above.
This article has looked primarily at the threshold jurisdictional question. But as we have said at the outset that jurisdictional question is in reality connected with how the Convention is expected to apply on the merits. 116 We have seen how flexible positive obligations can be in the context of contested territories. Such flexibility could in appropriate situations be further enhanced by taking into account other relevant areas of international law, such as IHL -e.g. in the still ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine. In other, stable and chronic situations of territorial contestation, as e.g. with regard to Northern Cyprus, the Court has also shown a willingness to normalize such situations somewhat 117 -consider how in Demopoulos the Court required, for
Clearly, the experience of the ECHR with contested territories is one that other human rights bodies can draw lessons from. Our focus was solely on the ECHR, but contested territories of the kind we have examined exist all over the world, and are probably more common outside Europe than within it. Just as it is inevitable that the European Court will have to deal more extensively with such situations in the future, so will other human rights courts and treaty bodies. 119 The main lesson to learn from the European experience, we think, is that good intentions do not necessarily translate to the most human rights-friendly outcomes.
Finally, we would note that the problems we have examined are by no means unique to human rights treaties. There is ongoing litigation, for example, as to how investment treaties would apply vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia with respect to foreign investments in Crimea. 120 The relevant dispute settlement mechanisms can also draw on the ECHR experience with contested territories -the fundamental dilemma (which need not be resolved in the same way in different branches of international law) is whether to primarily look at the facts on the ground or at formal considerations such as sovereignty as sources of legal obligation. At least in human rights law, our preference is strongly for the former.
